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 1 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the interpersonal aspects of the early development of an 
experience of external reality and the roots of this experience in primary 
intersubjectivity.  We suggest some implications this has for psychoanalytic 
work with the patient's experience of external reality. We argue that the 
external world is not an independently existing 'given', for the infant to 
discover, as is sometimes implicitly assumed. Infants acquire knowledge 
about the world not just through their own explorations of it but by using other 
minds as teachers. The experience of external reality is invariably shaped 
through subjectivities. We argue that at first the infant assumes that his 
knowledge is knowledge held by all, that what he knows is known by others 
and what is known by others is accessible to him. Only slowly does the 
uniqueness of his own perspective differentiate so that a sense of mental self 
can develop. In clinical work we frequently observe the undoing of this 
process of differentiation, and understanding the underlying mechanisms can 
be helpful in managing the transference and countertransference 
consequences when the process has been derailed. 
 2 
This paper continues the exploration of psychic reality we have undertaken in 
three previous papers published in this Journal.  Whereas the previous papers 
focused on internal reality and its distortion in severe personality disorder, the 
present paper asks the question begged by the previous papers concerning 
the experience of external reality, which psychoanalysts are far less frequently 
concerned with and often take for granted.  As in the previous papers, we link 
findings from developmental observations with clinical phenomena that we 
encounter in the consulting room.  In this paper we explore the interpersonal 
aspects of an experience of external reality and the roots of this experience in 
a primary intersubjectivity.   
Models of “psychic reality” and the primacy of psychic reality over 
material reality in psychoanalysis 
Psychoanalysis could be (and perhaps has been) defined as “the most 
profound exploration of human subjectivity that is consistent with systematic 
study”. Unfortunately, for historical reasons, this has led to a marginalizing of 
the external world by some psychoanalysts. Freud (1900) elaborated what 
became the concept of psychic reality in order to account for the surprising 
observation that disturbances provoked by  
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childhood trauma could be indistinguishable from those in which no such 
event had taken place. Internal experiences (beliefs, wishes, thoughts, 
anxieties) could carry the compelling quality of ‘real’ events. 
 3 
In a panel discussion on psychic reality held at the Mid-winter meeting 
of the American Psychoanalytic Association more than two decades ago, 
Robert Michels (1985) highlighted a common misapprehension that equated 
psychic reality with the inner world of subjective, personally constructed 
representations and perceptions, which was to be contrasted with the ‘real’ 
external world of objective things.  Michels pointed out that Freud used 
psychic reality to denote the inner source of subjective experience, rather than 
subjective experience per se.  External reality was seen by Freud as another, 
alternative source.  The experiential world for Freud, we learn from Michels, 
was a combination of sensations from the external world and derivatives of 
unconscious sources, psychic reality.  Both the components, psychic and 
material, were thought of as real but the subjectivity they gave rise to was not.  
Of course in this image implicitly both the drives and the physical world are 
seen as material although Freud only designated the latter with this term.  
Michels (1985) identified four models covering contemporary 
psychoanalytic approaches to psychic reality. (1) In the late Jacob Arlow’s 
(1984) conceptualisation, the role of analysis is to help patients learn to 
distinguish between reality and the effects of unconscious fantasies and 
disentangle these. The famous metaphor of external and internal projectors 
aiming at the translucent screen of subjective experience successfully 
captures this model.  (2) An alternative view sees psychoanalysis as helping 
the patient correct the distortions in his perception of reality brought about by 
his unconscious fantasies. (3) In contrast to both these views, Kleinian 
analysts in particular, suggest that only internal reality is knowable and the 
role of analysis is the reintegration of aspects of this split off subjectivity into 
 4 
the fullest possible version of subjective reality.  (4) The fourth model of 
psychic reality, perhaps especially characteristic of French psychoanalysis, 
sees the task of psychoanalysis as bringing a new special integration to the 
subjective world out of the psychic realities the patient brings with him to 
treatment.  All these views, addressing the fragmentation of or distortions to a 
reality, endorse to some extent a positivist view of reality as “out there”, for 
example able to be tested, and adapted to.  In order to define unconscious 
influence, the external environment had to be considered as relatively fixed, 
and known. Taking a developmental stance, external reality and internal 
reality cannot be seen as alternative perspectives, as figure and ground.  Both 
internal and external reality are learned about within the mother-infant 
relationship.  This shared process creates a sense of continuity between the 
experiences of internal and external.     
The aim of this paper is to begin to sketch out the more complex 
interrelationships that exist between internal and external by tracing the 
development of the infant’s awareness of external reality in order to aid theory 
building, address some  
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misconceptions, identify a few clinical implications and help towards working 
psychoanalytically with the external reality of our patients in a less constricted 
manner. 
 5 
The discovery of the internal in the external 
The dialectic of internal and external 
In many ways following in the footsteps of relational theorists (e.g. 
Bromberg, 1998; e.g. Mitchell, 1997; Mitchell, 2000; Renik, 1998) we now 
recognize that the intrapsychic and interpersonal domains of psychoanalysis 
come together in the intersubjective, in which reality is defined as a relational 
matrix that incorporates both the internal and the external world.  If we look 
outside ourselves, we do not see simply an external world; what attracts our 
attention are other minds, even though these are external to us.  What 
concerns us, in both the internal and the external world (for the most part) is 
subjectivity. Thus it is a mistake to contrast subjectivity (the internal domain of 
psychoanalysis) with externals and by implication objectivity (the domain of 
other disciplines).  The critical developmental dimension is shared, versus 
individual, subjectivity. The external comes to be something inherently ‘other’, 
not self, but this is a developmental achievement, not accessible to all of us, 
all of the time.   
In this sense the external world is a concept that could never be 
restricted to physical reality.  We will try to show that developmentally the 
external is inherently subjective, and the self necessarily differentiates itself 
from this larger subjectivity of ‘otherness’.  So in agreement with Freud, and 
somewhat differently from common parlance, we assume both external and 
internal to be part of psychic reality. However, only the external is ‘other’ and it 
is so for good developmental reasons. Being surrounded by subjectivities (the 
part of the external world that we are concerned with) indirectly generates 
within the human mind the individuality that gives experience its personal 
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quality, its meaningfulness.  The philosophical bases for this approach are 
well established (Cavell, 1994; Davidson, 1987; Wittgenstein, 1969) and are 
shared by a number of psychoanalytic traditions.  As Marcia Cavell (1994) 
wrote: “subjectivity arises along with intersubjectivity and is not the prior state” 
(p. 40).  This paper will try to elucidate the ontogenetic background to this 
assertion by considering key observations of early child development.1   
The eyes joining minds 
Perhaps it is stating the obvious that to humans the external world is 
not an independently existing ‘given’ that is there to be discovered.  Part of 
the meaning of being human is that we learn about the world not just through 
our own  
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explorations of it but by using other people as teachers.  External reality is 
invariably transmitted via subjectivities. Infants look at their caregivers to learn 
about the meaning of their experience (M Tomasello, 1999; M. Tomasello & 
Haberl, 2003). The classical demonstrations of social referencing2 in 
emotionally ambiguous situations (e.g. the crawling infant glancing at the 
mother before crossing the visual cliff, Hertenstein & Campos, 2004; Klinnert 
                                                 
1 In no way is this paper intended to add to the confusing set of developmental 
extrapolations to clinical practice which have sadly at times been made by 
psychoanalysts exploring the relevance of infant research to the clinical situation.  
Whilst we consider such research to be vital to our understanding of mind, in no way 
can this knowledge be considered directly applicable to the understanding of the 
adult patient in the clinic.  The misuse of the developmental metaphor was 
appropriately delineated in an excellent paper by Mayes and Spence a decade ago 
(Mayes & Spence, 1994).  
2 Social referencing can be defined as the seeking of information from another 
individual and the use of that information to evaluate a situation. 
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et al., 1983; Moses et al., 2001) are prototypical of a general stance we have 
towards gaining knowledge about the world. The fundamental assumption 
wired into the human infant (but probably not into the progeny of any other 
species) is that they may learn about the meaning of the universe that 
surrounds them by interacting with a mature member of the species. As Anna 
Freud discovered through her observations of young children caught up in 
war, and many other similar observations (e.g. of terrorist attacks) have 
confirmed, the traumatic impact of events such as bombing is much more 
dependent on the reaction of the parent than on the degree of danger, noise, 
the panic of strangers and so on.   
The newborn is immediately sensitive to eye contact and measures of 
brain activity quickly reflect differences associated with being looked at versus 
an averted gaze (Farroni et al., 2002). Most recently, studies have shown that 
young infants will follow an adult’s gaze (joint attention) if, and only if, the eye 
movement was preceded by mutual gaze (Farroni et al., 2003).  Establishing 
a link, a joining of minds is then an essential prerequisite for sharing the 
interest of another.  There is an interlocking of subjectivities that is followed by 
an opening of the mind to gathering information and seeing something new. 
Eye contact is one evolutionarily prepared mechanism to initiate this.  
Notwithstanding the obvious absence of eye contact in psychoanalysis, we 
would like to suggest that an analogous dual process incorporating a joining 
of minds and then a joining of attention to focus on a reality shared between 
but going beyond each mind is also at the heart of the analytic process.  
 8 
Sharing consciousness 
The idea of a shared consciousness in infancy is not new.  A number of 
developmentalists have emphasized the key functions of such sharing 
(Hobson, 2002; Rochat & Striano, 1999; Tomasello et al., 1993; Trevarthen, 
1993; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994).  Infants by 12 months of age do not just 
participate in joint attention, they also actively attempt to establish it, often 
apparently simply to share interest in something. For example, a recent study, 
(Liszkowski et al., in press) observed the impact of an adult reacting to the 
pointing behavior of 12-month-olds. Infants were not happy when the adult 
simply followed the infant’s pointing and looked to the object, or looked to the 
infant with positive affect, or did nothing. But they were satisfied when she 
responded by looking back and forth from the object to the infant and 
commented positively - implying that this sharing of attention and interest was 
their goal. Infants of 12 months happily point just to inform an adult of the 
location of a misplaced object they have no direct interest in (Liszkowski et al., 
2004). Such declarative  
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and informing motives are apparently "purely social" in their aims.  In other 
words infant research teaches us that human external reality is inherently 
shared because it is constructed out of shared feelings, shared intentions and 
shared plans. As adults we may conveniently place the world ‘out there’, but 
‘out there’ retains its historical connections with the earlier sense of a shared 
interpersonal reality. This shared reality which is largely built within 
 9 
attachment relationships may well give knowledge of the external world a 
lasting sense of significance and pleasure (or more negative qualities such as 
danger, depending on the quality of the early relationship).  
The dialectical relationship between what is external and internal 
emerges in the child’s discovery of his own mind.  The model developed by 
Gergely & Csibra (in preparation), Premack (2002) and others points to the 
centrality of shared subjectivity in the initial acquisition of information about 
the world.  Ed Tronick (2004) has offered an important explanatory 
developmental model of such dyadic states of consciousness (see also 
Gianino & Tronick, 1988) elaborated and created by a regulatory system to 
make meaning within and between individuals. The successful process of 
elaboration of shared meanings between individuals leads to a dyadic state of 
consciousness.  Inevitably, shared consciousness models sound abstract and 
somewhat implausible. We see evidence of this only rarely in maturity, for 
example in unusual moments of shared understanding and shared meanings 
with another person, but the compelling appeal of this state may be part of our 
pleasure in practicing psychoanalysis. 
There is accumulating evidence that dyadic interaction of this kind 
contributes to the achievement of normal brain organisation.  When infants 
cannot create such dyadic states the coherence and complexity of their self-
representation is dissipated; they move closer to states of disorganisation in 
both the emotional and cognitive domains. Phenomenologically, not causally, 
we believe that this state is an aspect of severe depression.  It is the infantile 
loss of contact with the external world of subjectivities that severe depression 
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recreates experientially. The loss of the underlying experience of shared 
consciousness makes the whole world appear flat, meaningless and isolating. 
In the recent psychoanalytic literature, the Argentinean family therapist 
and psychoanalyst, Isidoro Berenstein (2001), came close to describing this in 
his plenary address to the Nice Congress of the IPA. He argued that the crisis 
of psychoanalysis was in part due to the inward-turning and self-referential 
tradition of the theory, and that it could be radically revised by importing 
clinical understanding that naturally emerges from treating couples and 
families. Using the word ‘link’ in preference to the more traditional words 
‘relationship’ or ‘connection’, he intended to introduce a novel intersubjective 
metapsychology to his audience that would take fuller account of new 
experience and be less exclusively concerned with the repetition of past 
experiences. He claimed that treating couples and families forces the clinician 
to recognise that the links observed cannot be reduced to the internal-object 
world of participants in the system.  His attempt, judging by his discussant’s 
response (Doidge, 2001), was largely unsuccessful.  We believe that this was 
partly because he could not back his ideas up with relevant developmental 
observations that could establish the genetic origins of linked or shared 
consciousness.  
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The basic assumption of modern developmental theory is of a primary 
intersubjectivity – that knowledge about the world is shared knowledge.  To 
paraphrase this, the evolutionary underpinnings of human culture require that 
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the infant turns to others for essential information about the world.  It follows 
then that the infant assumes that his knowledge is knowledge held by all, that 
what he knows is known by others and what is known by others is accessible 
to him.  Only slowly does the uniqueness of his own perspective differentiate 
so that a sense of mental self can develop.  It is accepted that infants possess 
from the earliest days (by three months or so at the latest) a distinct sense of 
their integrity as physical beings.  But in relation to what we know and 
understand about reality we start with the assumption that knowledge is 
common and there is nothing unique about our own thoughts or feelings.  To 
use Arlow’s metaphor, there is but one projector, and the projection is 
experienced as coming from the screen, not from within.   
Just how deeply rooted our expectation about shared knowledge is, is 
indicated by what has been called the ‘curse of knowledge bias’ recently 
explored in a developmental context by Susan Birch and Paul Bloom (2004).  
This bias was originally formally described by three economists (Camerer et 
al., 1989), and refers to the common observation that if one knows something 
about the world one tends to assume that everyone else knows it too.  So, 
young children report that other children will know facts that they themselves 
have just learned (Taylor et al., 1994).  It seems clear and unsurprising that 
three-year-olds are more likely than older children to assume this (Birch & 
Bloom, 2003).  The curse of knowledge bias phenomenon accounts for the 
so-called ‘egocentrism’ of young children.  They cannot appreciate another 
person’s perspective, not because they assume that everyone’s perspective is 
the same as theirs, but rather because everyone knows the same things.  
Piaget’s concept of egocentrism has exactly the opposite emotional valence 
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to what is actually taking place.  It is not the overvaluing of private knowledge 
but the undifferentiated experience of shared knowledge that hinders 
perspective taking.  Many diverse observations show this (Birch & Bloom, 
2003; Fischhoff, 1975; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996; Keysar et al., 2003; Taylor et 
al., 1994). We assume that everyone has the same knowledge that we do, 
because most of our beliefs about the world were someone else’s before we 
made them our own. 
Young children do not yet know fully that their internal world is private 
and individual. This developmental configuration shapes unconscious fantasy 
and primes desire for ‘oneness’ and ‘merger’. They do not know that they can 
choose whether – for example – to share their thoughts and feelings with their 
parents, or their therapist. Perhaps one reason that toddlers are so prone to 
outbursts of rage and frustration is that since the world and individual minds 
are not yet clearly demarcated, they expect other people to know what they 
are thinking and feeling, and to see situations in the same way they do. Thus 
crossing their intentions seems malign or wilfully obtuse, rather than the result 
of a different point of view, alternative priorities, etc.  
The interpersonal roots of shared consciousness 
 What are the developmental bases for the joining of minds?  Why does 
the infant extend his consciousness beyond his bodily parameters?  These 
questions are closely related to a second set of questions that emerge from 
the explanation above: What  
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triggers the opening of one’s mind to new knowledge, to enter a joint domain 
of common focus and interest?  To make use of the other as an extension of 
self-experience, the other has to enter a dialectic as originally pointed out by 
Hegel (1807) and emphasised by Winnicott (1956) and Fairbairn (1952), by 
temporarily abolishing the boundaries of the self in order for the other to find 
himself within.  The importance of mutual gaze has already been considered, 
but ‘self-contingent interaction’ with the caregiver is an even more powerful 
process for marking identity, with a profound role in social development.  ‘Self-
contingent’ aspects of the world are things that change in response to the 
infant’s actions, and generate positive feelings by showing that he has an 
impact on the world  
The infant is sensitive from birth to such contingencies and responds to 
changes in the external world that are contingent with his body movements, 
his own body representing perfect contingency by matching proprioceptive 
cues with seeing his limbs move (Watson, 1985; Watson, 1994).  At four or 
five months, around the time that Melanie Klein dated the initial emergence of 
the depressive position, a switch is thrown and the infant avoids the kind of 
perfect contingencies that reflect body movements, and turns towards less 
perfectly contingent aspects of his environment (Watson, 1995; Watson, 
2001).  In practice this means a preference for the social world, part of the 
infant’s universe which we know to react with at best about 70% contingency 
to his actions (Rochat & Striano, 2002).  This process of contingency-seeking 
helps babies to know which adults in the environment (attachment figures, if 
trustworthy) have their mind in mind, and can best teach them about the 
world.   
 14 
But why the joining of minds?  We believe that the extension of 
consciousness beyond the child’s body perhaps reflects the way infants come 
to be able to regulate their emotions (Gergely & Watson, 1996, 1999).  
Mirroring the infant’s displays of emotion is an instinctual response for all 
adults (Meltzoff & Moore, 1997).  In the social biofeedback theory of emotion, 
Gergely and Watson describe how the infant’s illusion of control over the 
caregiver, as she contingently mirrors his distress, serves to soothe him and 
contributes to the down-regulation of emotion.  Further regulatory control is 
achieved through the creation of a second-order representation for what the 
infant is experiencing: the representation of the caregiver’s contingently 
mirroring, soothing affect display (Fonagy et al., 2002).  Thus the extension of 
consciousness is required since the infant finds and organises his affect state 
through mirroring by someone who has the infant in mind.  Importantly, part of 
this process is the creation of the basis of separateness as well as joining.  
The mirror display must have the Bionian function of containment as well as 
contingency in order to be effective.  The mother achieves this by 
systematically indicating that the mirrored state is not her own (Target & 
Fonagy, 1996).  Thus, paradoxically, for consciousness to be extended, for 
minds to be joined, a constraint must be added: what Gergely and Watson call 
‘markedness’.  Markedness makes the reflection of intense affect possible for 
the infant to take in: it indicates that the mother is not showing the baby her 
own feelings, but rather her awareness of his state.  Lack of markedness, in a 
sense overly accurate mirroring, prevents the creation of a joint mind; it forces 
the baby to prematurely experience his own feelings as ‘out there’ and not in a 
 15 
shared ‘here’.  It makes the infant’s experience appear contagious and is 
experienced as dangerous, 
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 leading potentially to traumatization.  We have preliminary evidence to 
suggest that the maintenance of an ‘as if’ attitude on the part of the caregiver 
contributes to the experience of effective self-regulation (Gergely & Fonagy, in 
preparation).  
The relational basis of learning about the world 
The well-known experimental ‘still face’ procedure has systematically 
explored the importance of contingency.  This has shown the devastating 
effect on a six-month-old infant when the caregiver stops responding 
contingently to his gestures even for a brief (two minute) period (Bazhenova 
et al., 2001; Haley & Stansbury, 2003; Rosenblum et al., 2002).  A very recent 
study demonstrated that when a person unknown to the six-month-old infant 
abruptly stopped interacting, maintained mutual gaze but with an immobile 
facial expression (for two minutes), the infant remembered that face and 
avoided it in preference to another face for at least 12 months. The disruption 
of contingency in the still face is catastrophic not simply because of the loss of 
the adult, or indeed the loss of the self as created in the adult’s mind, but the 
loss of the entire world that the infant and caregiver were in the process of 
constructing together.  
We have tested this assumption with George Gergely and colleagues 
using a modified still face procedure where mother and infant were able to 
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see each other not directly but in a mirror. We found that when the mother 
stops acting contingently with the infant, infants quite often turn away from the 
external world and seek perfect contingency either by looking at their own 
body or looking at their mirror-image.  We were surprised to find that the 
quality of the relationship between mother and infant was reflected in the 
strategy the child adopted (Gergely, 2004; Gergely & Fonagy, in preparation).  
Children whose relationship with their mothers was assessed as insecure 
were far more likely to turn to their own mirror image than infants who had 
established a secure attachment to their primary caregiver.   
Perhaps of even greater interest clinically was our observation that 
infants whose attachment to their caregiver was disorganised were not able to 
re-establish contingent interaction with her, but rather continued to explore 
their own image in the mirror. Disorganised attachment at 12 months is 
marked by sometimes quite extreme behaviours on the part of the infant 
during the reunion episode of the Strange Situation. They may freeze, attempt 
to escape from the mother, head-bang, self-harm or just collapse, feigning 
dead. In an earlier study, Koós and colleagues (Gergely, Koós et al., 2002; 
Koos & Gergely, 2001; Koós et al., 2000) demonstrated that the future 
disorganisation of attachment could be predicted from the pattern of response 
to loss of contingency. Six month olds who continued to look at themselves in 
the mirror after the end of the still-face episode were disorganised in their 
attachment in the strange situation six months later.   (These observations are 
consistent with the findings of another study that did not monitor self-looking 
but found “gazing away” in the still-face situation to be highly predictive of 
 17 
behavior problems at 18 months in infants of depressed mothers; Moore et 
al., 2001) 
We believe that the solipsism and lack of openness to new knowledge 
of the narcissistic stance may be rooted in this kind of behaviour.  We 
presume that the relational experiences associated with disorganised 
attachment, frightening parenting, helplessness, misattuned affect, 
dissociative episodes on the part of the caregiver,  
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predispose the infant to a desire to find only what he or she expects to 
find (Hesse & Main, 2001; Lyons-Ruth et al., 1999; Main & Hesse, 2001). 
Triggered perhaps by the loss of the shared external, the vulnerable infant is 
forced to find contingency from within. We were surprised to find such strong 
relationships but perhaps we should not have been.  The quality of early 
relationships does not only predict the capacity for later relationship formation. 
If anything the association to developing cognitive capacities is even stronger. 
Securely attached children retain a 5-10 point IQ advantage throughout their 
childhoods (e.g. Jacobsen et al., 1994; Jacobsen et al., 1997). (The loving 
background offered to children adopted from abroad may give them a highly 
significant IQ advantage relative to the children who were not adopted; 
Bimmel et al., 2003).  Bowlby, in all probability, underestimated the 
importance of attachment for human development.  It is not just the foundation 
of later social relationships, but also the primary path to discovering those 
 18 
who will be trustworthy informants about the nature of the world, and thus to 
the world itself.  
How do we find out about the external world? 
As should be obvious by now our concern here is with the subjectivity 
of the external. The child finds out about the world through the subjective.  We 
can learn little even about the simplest aspect of the world around us without 
joining the mind (the subjectivity) of the person teaching us. The extent of 
penetration of the subjectivity of the other that is necessary as part of the 
infant learning about the material world is well illustrated by a beautiful series 
of studies by George Gergely and his colleagues recently published in Nature 
(Gergely, Bekkering et al., 2002).   
The study concerns the acquisition of knowledge by imitation.  Imitative 
learning was defined by Meltzoff (see Meltzoff & Moore, 1989) as the capacity 
to acquire new ways of acting to achieve some outcome through observing 
others perform such acts and re-enactment of the novel action when one 
wants to achieve the same outcome.  Apes, Tomasello (1999) showed us, 
can only emulate, i.e. mostly try and bring about the same outcome but only 
through trial and error rather than being able to imitate the method that has 
been seen. Human infants in contrast show imitative learning by 14 months: 
They imitate the method rather than simply trying to reach the same result.  
This was demonstrated by Meltzoff in the so-called ‘head-on box’ study 
(Meltzoff, 1995).  An adult illuminates a magic light box by leaning forward 
and touching the top panel of the box with his forehead.  A week later 67% of 
the infants who observed this could re-enact it when given the box.  No infant 
 19 
performs this action spontaneously unless they have seen an adult act this 
way.   
This is then what is uniquely human. Identification is lacking in apes, 
who emulate rather than imitate. Even in this apparently simple case, infants 
make assumptions about the subjective state of the person that they are 
learning from.  Even in 14 month olds, imitation is not mindless.  When the 
infant observes the adult turning the light box on with his head and can see no 
reason why he didn’t use his hand, he infers that the adult would not perform 
this action unless the hand action had some intrinsic disadvantage.  Gergely 
and colleagues (2002) replicated the Meltzoff study, visibly constraining the 
arms and hands of the adult.  Under these circumstances, infants do not 
imitate the adult.  When the adult model’s hands are free, 14-month olds 
clearly  
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do imitate.  It seems the wise infants must have concluded that 
imitating was not rational if their situation and that of the adult model was 
different.  This simple study shows that what we learn about material objects 
in the outside world, even at 14 months, is filtered through a model of mind, a 
model we create harnessing our understanding of why the person we are 
observing acts the way he does.   Learning about the material world is not, 
even at 14 months, an automatic imitative internalisation of the external but a 
selective interpretive subjective process.  Re-enactment is not a linear 
 20 
consequence of identification but a rational inferential process that does not 
necessarily result in a copying of what was observed.   
Material versus psychological objects 
From the description above, you might have the impression that we 
believe that the infant learns about a physical object, such as the light box, 
through the psychological object.  There is a critical distinction here that is 
often missed.  To illustrate, the 14-month-old is repeatedly exposed to two 
adults looking at two objects (Egyed et al., 2004).  One adult consistently 
expresses interest when looking at a yellow object and disgust when looking 
at a red one.  The other adult consistently shows the opposite reaction.  The 
first adult is seen four times as often as the second.  The researchers looked 
at how surprised the infant was by one of the adults choosing either of the 
objects.  More surprise, measured as increased looking time, appeared to be 
associated with the adult choosing the object that was more frequently the 
object of disgust.  Importantly, this was the case regardless of which of the 
two adults showed this preference.  It seems, then, that the infant adopts the 
adult’s values and registers surprise when the adult’ s choice is 
counterintuitive.  However, the value is attached to the physical rather than 
the psychological object.  The specific adult’s attitudes are not yet observed 
and connected to that person.  Rather, the physical object is thought of as 
more or less desirable.   
Thus, our previous conclusion about the inherent subjectivity of 
learning about the physical world needs to be qualified in an important way.  
The infant finds the physical object through the subjectivity of the 
psychological object, but without taking note of this object as separate, 
 21 
independent from him and from other psychological objects in his world.  This 
impersonal, non-person specific aspect of early subjectivity is characteristic 
not just of particular types of deep regression that we occasionally encounter 
clinically.  We make common use of this assumption implicitly as part of 
routine work when we interpret analytic material in the transference, where 
the person whose attitude is being referred to appears insignificant or 
unimportant and interchangeable compared to the attitude itself (allowing the 
“you mean me” type interpretation that some of us favour).  As is so often the 
case, Freud (1900) noted this and considered it to be a feature of the freely 
mobile cathexis of the primary process.    
Moving from shared to separate consciousnesses 
Psychic equivalence 
In previous papers in this series (Fonagy, 1995; Fonagy & Target, 
1996, 2000; Target & Fonagy, 1996) we have identified two modes of 
representing the internal  
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world that antedate mentalization: the psychic equivalence and pretend 
modes.  In the pretend mode the child is able to maintain an ‘as if’ private 
reality which is known to be inconsequential, totally separated from the shared 
external world.  By contrast, with psychic equivalence everything is ‘for real’.  
We have thought of psychic equivalence as the equation of the internal with 
the external.  There can be no differences in perspective about the external 
world because it is isomorphic with the internal. For this reason ‘psychic 
 22 
equivalence’, as a mode of experiencing the internal world, can cause great 
distress because the projection of fantasy to the outside world is felt to be 
compellingly real.    
The development of our thinking outlined in this paper sheds new light 
on this duality.  In previous writings we had conflated two features of psychic 
equivalence: (a) equation with other minds and (b) equation with the physical.  
Rooted in the expectation of a shared consciousness is the belief that 
everyone shares my beliefs and related to that, the view that I know all there 
is to know about other states of mind and they know everything related to 
mine.  A separate but equally powerful aspect is what psychoanalysts usually 
refer to as the concreteness of this mode of thought, specifically that children 
consider their beliefs to be tantamount to reality.  “If I think it, then it is both 
true and real”.   
That these two aspects are separate is illustrated by the following 
example. The small child of three, late at night sees a dressing gown hanging 
on the back of his bedroom door and has the frightening thought that it might 
be a man in his room.   This thought is experienced as part of a physical 
reality: there is a man in the room.   This belief can only be dispelled by a 
change in material reality: the removal of the dressing gown or the reassuring 
presence of a protective person, or ideally both.  We would all agree that this 
example illustrates the compelling nature of the psychic equivalence mode of 
functioning, yet by this stage the first aspect of psychic equivalence, the belief 
in the shared nature of ideas, is evidently no longer present. 
This example helps us to see that in situations of stress or regression, 
the child or even an adult can experience a private reality with all the 
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compelling force of the shared, consensual experience that goes with 
perception of the material world.  Yet the child can see that his view is 
personal, with no implication for others, he does not think that his parents are 
frightened or at risk.  It feels shared because it is real but it is not shared 
because only the child is in danger. Psychic equivalence is only partial.   
We now see such quasi-shared experiences as characteristic of a 
transitional phase in the evolution of a subjective reality specific to the self.  
The infant starts with a sense of shared consciousness.  This concordance of 
views is essential in defining material reality, which is after all even for adults 
only definable through its characteristic of being shared.  However, for the 
infant to function in a social world, the uniqueness of his or her perspective 
must also be created out of this experience of shared consciousness.  The 
psychological self and consequently the sense of the other differentiates out 
of shared consciousness as the child becomes increasingly aware of 
instances where his knowledge and beliefs are not the same as those of the 
people around him.  This is the second way in which people around the child 
play a critical role in the development of the self, but until the mental world is 
established  
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as separate from the material world, this differentiated phase holds real 
dangers.  In this intermediate position, particularly in moments of physical 
isolation, when the need to reinvoke shared consciousness may be greatest, 
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the child inadvertently experiences his private reality as if it was universal, 
giving this reality its immediacy and force.   
The pretend mode 
We notice similar complications of development in relation to the 
second mode of primitive subjectivity we have described, the pretend mode.  
This mode emerges in the absence of shared consciousness and is disrupted 
or undermined if another person draws the child’s attention to his knowledge 
of reality and away from his pretend world. An illustration: when a boy, aged 
two and a half years, was playing that an upside down chair was a tank with 
the legs shooting ammunition, his father asked him: “Is this a chair or a tank?” 
The little boy stopped playing, put the chair the right way up and walked away.  
He knew that the object was a chair and not a tank, but in the pretend mode 
bringing external reality into contact with the play, destroys the possibility of 
imagination.  The very young child does generally seem to assume that 
external events are more powerful than his mental experiences and that they 
change the reality that he has to share. This is a reason, we think, why 
playing and especially pretending, best of all pretending with friends who will 
adopt a joint reality at odds with the commonly shared reality, is both fun and 
very important for children. In this intermediate phase it is essential that other 
people play along, so that the child has the compromise of shared and not 
shared.  As well as being pleasurable, it is funny, because for a change the 
power to make reality lies more in one’s own mind, but it also becomes real 
through being shared.  Another two and a half year old boy used to get up 
early every day aged two to three, having talked to himself and played for an 
hour or so first in bed, wanting to act out ‘plays’ to his parents, and 
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grandparents if available, apparently wanting to make the fantasy become 
real by sharing it.  
In this dissociated world, a private mind can develop. The role of play 
in delineating the subjective is apparent when we observe the way children 
use play, to mark out the personal territory of knowledge. We can see this in 
the child’s insistence, especially with more powerful people such as 
attachment figures, that his play must be done his way, and the extraordinary 
amount of time preschool children spend in negotiating the terms of pretend 
play, often not finished by the time they have to leave and the chance to start 
pretending has gone! Who is who, what they do, what is allowed to happen, 
are ways of making it safe to play together and share a new reality, a pretend 
space where a danger of psychic equivalence, the possibility of spoiling, again 
comes in because of impingement by other minds.3    
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Linking to the private world of others  
The acquisition of mentalisation is a powerful illustration of the 
intertwining of intrapsychic and external world considerations.  The child’s 
discovery of his thoughts and feelings as mental states depends on his 
discovery of these internal states as different from those held by others.  This 
                                                 
3 There is an excellent observational paper by Robert Emde and his colleagues 
(Emde, Kubicek & Oppenheim, 1997) which describes the development of 
imaginative psychic reality which “appears early, at the dawn of language, and 
reaches a peak of expressive activity between three and six years of age after which 
its use declines.” (p. 124).  Similarly to the present exploration, the development of 
pretend is seen as key in advancing mature symbolic function.  
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discovering of one’s own mind is a dialectic of exploration and sharing. 
Feeling safe in mental proximity to the caregiver undoubtedly helps to permit 
mental exploration of the outside to establish ‘otherness’. A secure 
attachment relationship has been shown by us and by others to facilitate later 
appreciation that others can have different feelings or beliefs from oneself 
(Fonagy, Redfern et al., 1997; Fonagy, Steele et al., 1997; Meins, 1997; 
Meins et al., 1998; Meins & Russell, 1997).  Why should this be the case?  
We believe that the child establishes his state of mind as different from those 
of his objects through a process of exploration that involves creating set or 
predictable reactions in the caregiver and others. The closer, the freer and the 
less distorted that relationship is, the more solidly the picture of the mental 
state of the person outside (the other) will be acquired (Steele et al., 2002).   
Bion (1959) was quite specific about the likely mechanism, giving the 
exploration of other minds through a process of projective identification, the 
term “normal”.  The child finds out about other minds through generating 
“counter-transference” responses from attachment figures, particularly parents 
and friends: sending probes and waiting for a reaction. 
With the arrival of mentalisation, the child suddenly recognises that he 
cannot be sure what the minds within other bodies think or feel.  Physical 
reality does not specify the other’s state of mind, what he knows is not the 
limit of knowledge of minds, and simply thinking something does not make it 
true.  This recognition entails a sense of loss as well as a loss of control over 
the external world and grandiosity, but also gives him a precious new tool for 
understanding the actions of others for which previously only crude 
interpretations in terms of physical constraints and observable goals could be 
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given (teleological thinking) (Csibra & Gergely, 1998; Gergely & Csibra, 1996, 
1997; Gergely & Csibra, 2003).    To discover other minds and how they work, 
repetition of these exploratory projections is critical.  The social ‘promiscuity’ 
of most preschool children relative to their more focused bonding at earlier 
times may be an adaptive strategy to discover more about how minds in the 
world outside work. It is critical that the child has a clear sense that his 
knowledge of internal states only extends as far as the physical body he 
controls.  In patients with psychosis where this association breaks down the 
exploratory projections generate deep confusion and experiences of either 
controlling or being controlled. Little wonder that hypermentalisation (over-
attributing mental states) is normally defended against, and the notion of 
shared consciousness is troubling even to us psychoanalysts. 
 These mental acts of projective exploration may well have instinctual 
roots.  A number of theoreticians have suggested that at a deeply 
unconscious level mental activity may be represented as action (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999).  The action associated with this kind of normal projective 
process is likely to be sexual exploration (Fonagy & Target, in press), a 
probing or penetration that could set up an important instinctual context for the 
discovery of other minds.  At the same time, we continue  
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to use our capacity to mentalize to try to get a better knowledge of what is in 
our own minds. With fear and trauma the probing of other minds is commonly 
abandoned and self-knowledge is often even more likely to be sacrificed. 
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This process relates directly to the falling back on a focus on the 
physical self when there is a loss of social contingency, which we have 
discussed before.  We saw that infants with disorganised attachment, 
exposed in the first year of life to unpredictable loss of contingent reactions 
(Goldberg et al., 2003; Lyons-Ruth, 2003), react by creating a highly 
predictable experience, looking at themselves.  We anticipate that these 
individuals will have grave difficulty in engaging in the kind of normal 
projective identificatory process described above.  The reaction of the other is 
too unpredictable.  The playful exploration, the generating of a response 
without being able to anticipate what this might be is too frightening.  To cope 
with this and yet engage in such exploration, the projective identificatory 
process is enhanced, the child engages in massive rather than playful 
projection. The sequel of disorganized attachment in infancy is indeed highly 
controlling and manipulative behavior at 3-5 years of age (e.g. Moss et al., 
2004) and abnormalities have been noted well into adolescence (e.g. 
Weinfield et al., 2004).  
In this way the reactions are far more predictable but the subtlety of 
discovering about otherness is also compromised.  The person will learn less 
about how minds outside work and the reactions received will feel 
consequently less real and at times almost without meaning.  This state of 
affairs is pervasive in a narcissistic personality structure where the wish to 
discover about the mind of the other conflicts with a fear of otherness and 
what Berenstein (2001) described as a resistance against linking with the 
mental world of the external comes to dominate.  Clinically working with such 
individuals is a common experience for psychoanalysts.  The hallmarks of the 
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clinical presentation are: manipulativeness, the meaninglessness and 
valuelessness of what is discovered, the stunning exchangeability of ideas 
pointing to the persistence of pretend mode functioning with occasional 
catastrophic shifts into psychic equivalence when failure can be experienced 
as actual destruction.  We will briefly illustrate such a clinical case.   
A clinical illustration of narcissistic resistance to linking 
Miss A 
As a child Miss A sought solace from early neglect in endless fantasy 
play with a pretend farm.  She threw herself into her analysis, exclaimed 
about its value, wept and laughed, thought hard and showed anger, but the 
analyst gradually began to suspect that her experiences of herself were not 
genuine.  She would speak about the great progress that the analysis was 
making, or how "good" a session was, but in the counter-transference, the 
analyst4 felt an odd sense of disquiet after such remarks. He could not build a 
picture of her. She would present herself as sentimental and sensitive, but in 
the next session she would describe herself being cruel. At times she could 
appear depressed, hopeless and self-hating, at other times, triumphant and 
grandiose. There was no sense of continuity between her personae.  
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Gradually the analyst understood that the pictures she painted were of 
course projected in order to manipulate his feelings towards her, but not 
simply to set up role relationships – there was too little consistency for that. 
                                                 
4 The analyst was Peter Fonagy. 
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Her apparent callousness and arrogance was not a reflection of malevolence 
but a pathological exaggeration of a normal form of self exploration. She was 
demanding that he should enact a relationship with a malevolent person: be 
forgiving, critical, frightened or whatever, to allow her to find what her 
projective probes made of him, she was trying to find herself in her external 
subjectivity. Her chameleon-like self-representations were like experiments 
into him that, through his reactions, would show her his mind and through that 
her own.  
The relation of these probes to her actual inner experience was almost 
arbitrary, as if there were no connections between her inner states and 
external reality. Thus the analyst learned that her extravagant excitement 
about each new project actually marked a state of loneliness and 
worthlessness. By contrast her sadness before breaks was always thinly 
overlaid by excitement. What helped him understand her was seeing this 
‘false’ excitement as subjectively equivalent to sadness, not a defence against 
it. She was trying to find her sadness in the outside (in him), because within 
she could not feel it. The ‘excitement probe’ was sent to see if he would feel 
sad about losing her, not to communicate her own feelings. Thus, she could 
not relate to his suggestion that her hypomanic excitement before the 
weekend protected her from feeling lonely. It helped much more when he 
simply said that “she felt so alone with all the excitement”, or that “she was 
sad she could not get other people to join in with her pleasure”, and later, that 
“the coming weekend felt difficult because I would not be there to see how 
pleased she was about her work”. The false emotion was the closest she was 
able to get to the intangible feelings that so deeply confused her. The 
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excitement she displayed may have been the mother’s attempt to comfort the 
baby she was leaving, by an exaggerated false brightness, but its current 
function was to test the analyst’s experience of her. Through that, perhaps 
she could find out what she felt.  
Her attempts at creating emotions in the analyst had a desperate 
quality.  She did things that might have felt acceptable for a child under five 
but appeared grossly manipulative in an adult patient.  She missed sessions 
then rang me late at night, she brought her childhood toy dolls to ‘listen’ to 
what he had to say, she covered her head up under the blanket on the couch, 
she hid from the analyst under his desk, she came to a session with her 
laptop to make notes on what he said, and so on.  Beyond the destructive 
intent of sabotaging a process and the analyst’s ability to think about her, she 
also needed to create an external reality that she could experience.  Because 
for much of her life nothing felt real, these dramatic histrionic experiences felt 
real because she felt them to be shared.   
The analyst’s attempts at interpreting her unconscious intent could not 
bear fruit because they undermined her fragile sense of what was real.  She 
needed to tell him about her grand achievements, about how others admired 
her, about the wonderful things that were likely to happen, to make these 
experiences shared, real and part of an external reality.  This was driven in 
part by her low self-esteem, but more than that, it was also a way of 
constructing a real external reality because the one that she was  
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in felt to her quite unreal, as it was so distorted that it could not be shared by 
anyone.  Feelings she attributed to herself, the analyst or any other object 
lacked depth, they were experienced in the pretend mode. They could be felt 
as representational, i.e. known as internal states, but linking them to anything 
‘real’ was impossible so they were without any consequence for her. For 
something to feel real, Miss A felt she had to force the person she was with to 
enact that role, which she could then deal with through action. For it to feel 
real, it had to exist on the outside, the psychic equivalence mode of 
experiencing the subjective. To achieve this however, she had first to disable 
the analyst’s ability to think for himself and get him to DO things. Sadly, 
probably all that helps under these circumstances is the analyst's remaining 
able to think independently under such pressure.  With a person like Miss A 
the task of analysis is of creating an external reality that does not yet exist for 
the patient, not because the external world is not there but because the 
fragility of her subjectivity, her internal reality, prevented her from 
experiencing the external world as real.  The analyst restricted himself to 
describing how she presented the way things were, including the anxieties 
which drove her to present them that way. Again and again he interpreted her 
need for control. We might call such interventions "small interpretations" as 
they were little more than frequent, transference-focused clarifications of his 
best guess at Miss A's mental state.   
 
Conclusions 
Have we advanced our understanding of how psychoanalysis can 
make a place for the external world? The external world turns out to be a 
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world of subjectivities.  It requires the same combination of intrapsychic and 
intersubjective awareness as the internal world.  Understanding the 
development of an appreciation of external reality might help us understand 
specific problems we frequently encounter clinically. Some of these perhaps 
we are overly keen to interpret as belonging to the domain of the internal and 
we may be overzealous in placing outside our remit aspects of our patient’s 
difficulties that we perceive as belonging to the outside world.  The 
perspective we advocate in some ways blurs the distinction between the two.  
In normal development external reality is rooted in and stands for a sense of 
shared consciousness with the object, an agreement so close about the 
nature of things that an independent perspective cannot be identified.  By 
contrast, when we assert our personal view of the outside, we are defining 
that which has individuated from a primarily intersubjective self.  
The interplay of these two domains is evident in a range of contexts. 
For example, the phenomenology of depression may not be readily 
understandable without considering the involvement in it of an experience of 
lack of shared consciousness (outside, as well as inside). Narcissism as a 
phenomenon may be seen as more textured if we take into consideration the 
desperate fear of these individuals not to locate themselves in ‘real’ 
interactions with us. Later papers will attempt to show how these ideas 
illuminate severe depression and narcissistic personality functioning. 
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